This paper surveys efforts to automate the dating of business cycle turning points. Doing this on a real time, out-of-sample basis is a bigger challenge than many academics might presume due to factors such as data revisions and changes in economic relationships over time. The paper stresses the value of both simulated real-time analysis-looking at what the inference of a proposed model would have been using data as they were actually released at the time-and actual real-time analysis, in which a researcher stakes his or her reputation on publicly using the model to generate out-of-sample, real-time predictions. The immediate publication capabilities of the internet make the latter a realistic option for researchers today, and many are taking advantage of it. The paper reviews a number of approaches to dating business cycle turning points and emphasizes the fundamental trade-off between parsimony-trying to keep the model as simple and robust as possible-and making full use of available information. Different approaches have different advantages, and the paper concludes that there may be gains from combining the best features of several different approaches.
Introduction
U.S. real GDP has grown significantly over time, today standing at a level more than seven times that seen in 1947 (see Figure 1 ). Economists broadly agree on the three factors responsible for that long-run growth. First, the population has increased over time, and more people can produce a greater quantity of goods and services. Second, the stock of equipment and facilities that people have to work with has also increased more than six-fold over this period. And third, the techniques of production, such as higher-yielding crops, faster computers, and more efficient management have all produced tremendous improvements in productivity. These three factorspopulation, capital stock, and technology-are widely regarded to be the main drivers of long-run growth.
But GDP does not increase every single year, and it is of substantial interest to understand why. None of these three factors offer very appealing explanations for downturns. In a recession, we do not lose population; rather, an ever-growing number of people report they are unable to find jobs. Capital stock is not destroyed, but instead sits idle. And although the hypothesis that recessions may be caused by an exogenous decline in productivity has been popular with real business cycle theorists, many of us do not find that account compelling. Something other than these three factors seems to be governing aggregate economic behavior during particular identifiable episodes. These episodes are referred to as economic recessions, indicated by the shaded regions in Figure 1 .
The importance of recessions is even more dramatic when we consider a series such as the U.S. unemployment rate in Figure 2 . There is no clear trend in this series over the last half century. But there is a quite dramatic tendency for unemployment to rise sharply during periods characterized as economic recession. The habit of accompanying graphs like Figures 1 and 2 with recessions indicated as shaded regions is quite ingrained in the economics profession, and with good reason. One of the first things we want to know about any series is how its fluctuations are related to movements in and out of economic recession.
The question discussed in this paper is, where should those shaded regions be drawn, that is, when did each particular recession begin and end? The conventional answer for U.S. data is to use the dates determined by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research. This is a group of distinguished scholars who meet periodically to discuss recent data, and from time to time issue a proclamation that a recession began or ended at a particular date in the past. Typically, once the Committee makes a pronouncement, that date is not subsequently revised.
That is a fine approach to use, and this paper does not advocate abandoning it. I nevertheless investigate whether it is possible to supplement the deliberations of the Committee with mechanical algorithms that could process incoming data in real time and issue a judgment on a purely objective basis. There are three potential benefits to doing so. The first is timeliness. The bottom panel of Figure 3 notes the particular dates at which the Business Cycle Dating Committee issued its most recent announcements. These announcements often came long after the fact.
For example, the NBER dated the 1990-91 recession as beginning in August 1990 and ending in March 1991. It made the announcement that the recession had begun in April 1991-one month after the NBER later decided that the recession was already over. The end of the 2001 recession was announced in July 2003, which is 28 months after the recession is now deemed to have ended.
A second benefit of a purely objective algorithm for making these determinations in real time is that it would ensure that the process is completely apolitical. Although no one has accused the NBER of altering its announcements on the basis of political considerations, the pressure is undeniably present to delay the announcement that a recession has begun or accelerate the announcement that a recovery has begun if one's goal were to help the incumbent. In the October 13, 1992 debates, then vice-presidential-candidate Al Gore referred to the "worst economic performance since the Great Depression." Although the recession of 1990-91 is now seen as one of the shortest and mildest of the postwar recessions, it was not until December 22, 1992-after the presidential elections-that the NBER announced that the recession had actually ended in March of 1991. If it had been the case that the recession that began in August 1990 was still ongoing as of October 1992, Gore's statement would have factual support in the sense that the ongoing recession would have been the longest on record since 1933. Being able to issue these announcements on the basis of a pre-determined, purely mechanical algorithm would insulate the procedure from any possible charges of partisanship.
Third, coming up with a mechanical means to recognize business cycle turning points offers further elucidation of what we actually mean when we say that the economy is in a recession. If the dates assigned by the NBER represent the answer, what is the question? The whole process seems to presuppose that there are some very different factors operating on the economy at some times relative to others, and that these changes have observable implications. Mechanization of the dating procedure can help clarify exactly how and why we assign the dates that we do.
In this paper I survey some of the approaches to dating business cycle turning points, with a focus on algorithms that various analysts have publicly relied on with real-time data. I begin in Section 2 with a review of some early efforts and why the task might be harder than it looks. Section 3 describes in detail a procedure that I have been relying on for the last five years. A number of alternative approaches are discussed in Section 4.
What's so hard?
One's first thought might be that it shouldn't be too hard to do better than the multi-year lags sometimes associated with NBER announcements, and indeed the really exciting thing would be to predict business cycle turning points before they occur. What's so hard about that?
The first answer is that if people could have predicted the recession, it probably wouldn't have happened. Firms would not have been stuck with inventories, labor, and capital they turned out not to need, and the Federal Reserve probably would have chosen to ease its policy stance sooner. Economists are used to viewing magnitudes such as stock prices as difficult or impossible to predict if the market is functioning properly. It may be that economic recessions by their nature imply similar fundamental limitations for forecasting.
Second, the data available at the time are often sending a different signal from what one sees once the data are subsequently revised. For example, the top panel of Figure 4 displays real GDP growth rates for each quarter of 2001 as they were reported at the end of 2002. This vintage of data shows 3 successive quarters of declining real GDP, which certainly sounds unambiguously like a recession. On the other hand, the bottom panel shows data for the same quarters as they were actually reported on January 30, 2002. At that date the recession was already over, but recognizing those GDP numbers available at the time as signalling a recession is obviously a much bigger challenge.
A third factor making it difficult to recognize business cycle turning points in real time is the fact that key economic relations are continually changing over time. I illustrate these difficulties by reviewing the real-time track record of two prominent efforts to predict business cycle turning points.
Stock and Watson's original business cycle index model.
One of the impressive early efforts along these lines came from the business cycle indicators developed by James Mark Watson (1989, 1991) . Their coincident index model postulated that an observed vector of monthly indicators y t was related to an unobserved scalar c t thought to represent the business cycle according to
The observed variables in y t consisted of growth rates of industrial production, personal income, sales, and employment. White noise disturbances ε rt and η t were taken to be mutually uncorrelated and D(L) is a diagonal matrix in the lag operator L. Thus the model postulated that the observed dynamics of each y rt could be explained in terms of idiosyncratic autoregressive terms u rt and common dependence on the business cycle c t . This will be recognized as a state-space model with state vector (u 0 t , c t ) 0 and observation vector y t , for which algorithms for estimating the unknown parameters by maximum likelihood and forming an optimal inference about the unobserved state of the business cycle c t are well known. Stock and Watson further defined an unobserved variable S t to be unity if the economy was in recession at date t. They interpreted a recession to be a particular pattern followed by c t ,
with the set B t designed so as to best mimic historically-assigned NBER recession dates. The basic Kalman filter algorithms allow one to form an inference about current or past recessions
for h = 0, 1, 2, ..., or forecast of future recessions
For the latter purpose Stock and Watson also developed a leading-indicator generalization of the model of the form
for y t now a vector based on levels or growth rates of some conventional leading indicators along with a few new indicators proposed by Stock and Watson.
The in-sample performance of their model is summarized in Figure 5 . The top panel gives the contemporaneous inferences (h = 0 in equation (2)), which looked quite good. The model might seem to have produced a "false positive" in 1967, though this was a widely recognized economic slowdown which perhaps could reasonably have been categorized as an economic recession. The 3-and 6-month ahead forecasts (lower panels in Figure 5 ) also looked extremely promising.
Encouraged by these in-sample results, Stock and Watson began in 1988 to report updated probabilities of recession each month using the latest data. Initially these were distributed by FAX and mail to assorted researchers and members of the press, and later were posted on the web.
1 Figure 6 displays the model's real-time track record over the 1990-91 recession as described by Stock and Watson (1993) . The leading index proved to be a disappointment-the recession of 1990 came and went, with the model always predicting that no recession was coming (see bottom panels of Figure 6 ). The contemporaneous index in fact did by November of 1990 signal that a recession had started (top panel), but the model thought it was going to be sufficiently short-lived that the 3-and 6-month-ahead probabilities always remained below 50% even though ex-post probabilities eventually recognized that a recession had arrived at some earlier date.
What went wrong? One of the intriguing new leading indicators that Stock and Watson discovered was the spread between the yield on commercial paper and Treasury bills. and an alternative leading index that did not make use of interest rates or interest rate spreads.
The models' performance over the 2001 recession was similar to that for the 1990-91 downturn.
The alternative leading index calculated a 6-month-ahead probability of recession P (t + 6|t) that 2.2 Using the yield curve to predict turning points.
Many of the subsequent academic papers in this area have focused on procedures that might be simpler and more robust. Quite a few academic studies have suggested that the slope of the yield curve-for example, the spread between yields on a 10-year Treasury bond and a 3-month Treasury bill shown in the top panel of Figure 8 -seems to be extremely promising as a predictor of recessions; see among others Estrella and Mishkin (1998) , Chauvet and Potter (2005) , Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008) , and Katayama (2009) . As the yield curve again became inverted in August of 2006, many observers began to wonder whether this meant another recession would soon arrive.
One aspect of the situation that made this a difficult call at the time was the fact that although the 3-month rate was above the 10-year rate, the overall level of the 3-month rate was lower than it had been prior to any recession since 1960 (see the bottom panel of Figure 8 ). Many observers argued that the low overall level of interest rates mitigated somewhat the recessionary signal given by the inverted yield curve.
One specification that came to be used in ongoing real-time announcements was one developed by Jonathan Wright (2006) . Wright defined a historical indicator H t to be unity if it subsequently proved to be the case that NBER would declare any of the following four quarters to have been characterized by an economic recession:
His model then calculated the probability of a recession occurring some time over the next year
for Φ(.) the N (0, 1) cumulative distribution function, i 10y,t the 10-year Treasury yield, i 3m,t the 3-month Treasury yield, and i ft the fed funds rate.
The website Political Calculations reported weekly updates of the predictions of this model between April 2006 and August 2008 (see Figure 9 ). The highest this probability ever reached was 50% on April 4, 2007, after which the probability monotonically declined. It stood at only 10% on August 20, 2008, right before one of the worst 6 months that the economy has experienced over the last half century.
These two examples illustrate that a good in-sample fit is no guarantee of out-of-sample realtime performance. As Yogi Berra observed, it's tough to make predictions, especially about the future. In this paper I instead pursue the more modest goal of trying to recognize a turning point soon after it occurred using algorithms that would be robust with respect to data revisions and out-of-sample structural change. The next section describes one very simple approach that so far seems to have a reasonable track record. Suppose we are given only the value for a given quarter's GDP growth, and aren't told how the NBER is eventually going to characterize that quarter. Can we infer from which of the two distributions it is most likely to have been drawn? Let S t = 1 if quarter t is eventually declared by the NBER to be part of a recession, S t = 2 if it is eventually declared to be part of an expansion, and let y t denote the observed GDP growth. Let P (S t = 1, y t ) denote the joint probability that quarter t is a recession and has GDP growth given by y t ,
which is found by multiplying the height of the curve in the top panel of Figure 10 by 0.2.
Likewise P (S t = 2, y t ) is obtained by multiplying the height of the middle curve by 0.8. The optimal inference,
will then be recognized as simply the ratio of the height of the green curve to the height of the black curve in the bottom panel of Figure 10 . For example, if we observe GDP growth of y t = −6
we could be quite confident this would be characterized as a recession, whereas if we observe y t = +6, it will almost surely be classified as an expansion.
Such a rule seems to satisfy the requirements of being extremely simple and robust. But unfortunately, it is not terribly helpful, because the vast majority of observations will fall in a range where they don't send a very clear signal. But there is a second feature of the NBER dates that can be quite helpful-the value of S t is pretty likely to be the same as S t−1 . Ninety-five percent of the observations for which S t−1 = 2 it was the case that S t also equalled two, whereas 78% of the observations for which S t−1 = 1 were followed again by S t = 1. Thus, even if y t alone does not give us much of a useful signal, the value of y t−1 can help us refine it. For example, an observed value of y t = 1.0 tells us very little, implying (by calculating the ratio of heights just described) a probability of recession P (S t = 1|y t = 1.0) = 0.21 that is little different from the unconditional odds. But suppose this follows after a quarter of strong growth, y t−1 = 6.0, from which the height ratio calculation yields a very low probability of having been in recession the previous quarter: P (S t−1 = 1|y t−1 = 6.0) = 0.074. Before seeing the quarter t GDP numbers, we would accordingly have known that the probability of a recession observation in period t is only 10% rather than the unconditional probability of 20%:
Having observed y t−1 = 6.0, to use the period t value for y t we'd then want to weight the blue curve in the top panel by 0.1 rather than by 0.2 to arrive at the appropriate conditional probability:
P (S t = 1|y t , y t−1 ) = f(y t |S t = 1, y t−1 )P (S t = 1|y t−1 ) f (y t |S t = 1, y t−1 )P (S t = 1|y t−1 ) + f(y t |S t = 2, y t−1 )P (S t = 2|y t−1 )
.
From this calculation it turns out P (S t = 1|y t = 1.0, y t−1 = 6.0) = 0.11; having seen strong growth the preceding quarter, we'd be reasonably confident that the expansion is continuing this quarter despite the weak GDP report. We can of course extend such calculations, doing better yet using the whole history of observations up to the present to calculate P (S t = 1|y t , y t−1 , ...., y 1 ).
For that matter, the same principles allow us to use observations on y t+1 , y t+2 , ....y T to refine our assessment of where the economy was at some date t, which we refer to as a full-sample smoothed probability:
P (S t = 1|y T , y T −1 , ..., y 1 ).
I described above how such an inference could be implemented nonparametrically with little assumed structure other than some very broad features of the NBER dating record. But there's little reason we need to be nonparametric, since the distribution in the top panel of Figure 10 could clearly be well approximated with a Gaussian density. Also, little is lost by assuming that the variance of the distributions in the top two panels is the same. In other words, we could parameterize the top two panels of Figure 10 as
expecting to use µ 1 = −1.2, µ 2 = 4.5, and σ = 3.4. If we let π denote the unconditional probability that a given quarter will be characterized by recession (expecting π = 0.2), we can characterize the height of the black curve in the bottom panel of Figure 10 for observation t = 1 as
for φ(.) the Normal density, with the proposed inference given by
For observation t = 2 we were proposing to calculate
with p 11 denoting the probability of a recession continuing, p 11 = P (S t = 1|S t−1 = 1), and p 22 the probability of an expansion continuing. Iterating for t = 3, 4, ..., we have
for ξ t = p 11 P (S t−1 = 1|y t−1 , y t−2 , ..., y 1 ) + (1 − p 22 )P (S t−1 = 2|y t−1 , y t−2 , ..., y 1 ).
If we interpreted the persistence of recessions and expansions as the sole source of serial dependence in observed GDP growth rates, we could also use the above recursion to calculate a conditional likelihood function for the tth observation:
Using the unconditional probability given by π = (1 − p 22 )/(1 − p 22 + 1 − p 11 ), we could then calculate the sample log likelihood as
log f (y t |y t−1 , y t−2 , ..., y 1 ; θ)
solely as a function of observed GDP growth rates and the assumed parameter vector θ = (µ 1 , µ 2 , σ, p 00 , p 11 ) 0 , and maximize this log likelihood with respect to θ. The top panel of Figure 11 plots the filter inference (3) for each date t in the 1947:Q2-2004:Q2
sample, along with NBER-determined recession dates. The correspondence with the NBER dates is quite close, suggesting that this algorithm offers a promising alternative for recognizing business cycle turning points. However, although the formula (3) only makes use of data through date t, it would be a mistake to suppose that it would do as well in a real-time setting, for two reasons. as to form an inference. Use of data as actually available at the time resulted in a considerable deterioration of reliability. We therefore recommended waiting one quarter for data to be revised and to be able to use the added precision afforded by one-quarter smoothing before making a declaration, so that one only tries to form an inference about S t when the GDP growth rate for the next quarter, y t+1 , is first released. This real-time one-quarter-smoothed inference is plotted in the lower panel of Figure 11 . This exercise suggested that such an inference might indeed offer a useful method for recognizing business cycle turning points.
In our 2006 paper we recommended the following decision rule. When the one-quarter 4 One could of course propose a more elaborate parametric model, such as allowing further dynamics in GDP growth beyond those induced by the business cycle, as in the original specification of Hamilton (1989) . However, even as fundamental an indicator as GDP has had changing business-cycle behavior over time (e.g., McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) . The extreme simplicity of the model described here may give it more robustness with respect to these changes than more detailed specifications. smoothed inference P (S t = 1|y t+1 , y t , ..., y 1 ;θ t+1 ) first exceeds 0.65, declare that a recession has started, and at that time assign a probable starting point for the recession as the beginning of the most recent set of observations for which P (S t−j = 1|y t+1 , y t , ..., y 1 ;θ t+1 ) exceeds 1/2. The recession call would remain in effect until P (S t = 1|y t+1 , y t , ..., y 1 ;θ t+1 ) falls below 0.35, and at that time assign a probable ending point for the recession as the beginning of the most recent set of observations for which P (S t−j = 1|y t+1 , y t , ..., y 1 ;θ t+1 ) is less than 1/2.
The starred entries in Table 2 summarize the simulated real-time performance of this algorithm.
The dates assigned to historical recessions are quite close to those determined by the NBER, and would typically be announced at about the same time as the NBER announcements. On the basis of these results, I was persuaded that this approach offered a promising alternative for categorizing business-cycle turning points on a real-time basis. Since July of 2005, I have been regularly reporting at the website www.econbrowser.com the value of P (S t = 1|y t+1 , y t , ..., y 1 ;θ t+1 ) each quarter when the advance GDP numbers are first released. Although the algorithm has so far proved to be robust in terms of its out-of-sample performance, it was not particularly timely in making the call that the recession had started, coming one month later than the NBER's declaration, and much later than all observers understood that a powerful economic downturn was underway. Why was the signal from GDP indecisive until Given what we were attempting to do with this procedure-form an inference based solely on GDP growth-it is hard to dispute that this was the correct call given the data at the time, and I feel that the procedure performed well in terms of that objective. But it is clearly worth taking a look at the real-time performance of various other procedures that were making use of alternative economic indicators.
Real-time track record of models based on other indicators
I motivated the calculations above as an essentially model-free robust inference, while noting that the calculations could alternatively be derived as the optimal statistical inference about an unobserved recession variable S t that takes on the value of 1 or 2 according to the outcome of a Markov chain and with GDP growth y t conditional on S t coming from one of two Normal distributions. As described in Hamilton (1994, Chapter 22) , one can also conduct similar inference on much more elaborate parametric formulations by postulating that the history of being in recessions affects the conditional density of some observed vector of indicators y t according to f (y t |y t−1 , y t−2 , ..., y 1 , S t , S t−1 , ..., S 1 ; θ) for f (.) an arbitrary density governed by unknown pa-rameters θ. This section reviews the real-time experience with inferring business cycle turning points based on different indicators and alternative Markov-switching time series models.
Gross domestic income.
The national income accounting convention is that every dollar of value added by definition generates a dollar in income for somebody. We could measure GDP either by looking at expenditures or by looking at income, and should in principle get exactly the same number either way. The Bureau of Economic Analysis does indeed make calculations based on both methods, but in practice the number obtained is not exactly the same, and the difference between gross domestic product and gross domestic income is officially reported by the BEA as a "statistical discrepancy." If the BEA measurements were all correct, that discrepancy would be zero.
Jeremy Nalewaik (2007 Nalewaik ( , 2010 has argued that GDI may provide helpful information in addition to GDP, particularly for purposes of recognizing business-cycle turning points. The top panel of Figure 14 plots the growth rates of GDP and GDI; note that GDI was sending a significantly more Does this mean that we should base an inference on GDI rather than GDP? By definition, we do not have a good understanding of what the statistical discrepancy may represent, and the conventional view is that GDP may be the slightly more reliable indicator. Certainly for the most recent recession, GDI would have provided a more timely signal, but for some earlier episodes, the GDI-based inference from the bottom panel of Figure 14 is less reliable than the GDP-based inference in Figure 12 . If we have to rely on just one for future unknown incoming data, I am more comfortable sticking with GDP, even though GDI did better last time. It might be possible to try to combine the information from the two series in a more parsimonious way, for example, using a weighted average of the two measures.
Unemployment rate.
The dramatic cyclical behavior of unemployment seen in Figure 2 suggests we might have better success with a measure based on the unemployment rate rather than GDP, with sharp and rapid increases in unemployment being perhaps a defining characteristic of an economic recession. My 2005 paper proposed the following model for y t the monthly unemployment rate,
where u t is distributed Student t with estimated degrees of freedom and S t is assumed to follow an unobserved 3-state Markov chain. This specification will be recognized as a generalization of the parametric interpretation of the approach to GDP above, in allowing for additional dynamics beyond shifts in the business-cycle phases (as represented by nonzero values for φ 1 and φ 2 ) and allowing for three rather than two business cycle states (as represented by the three possible values for the intercept, c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 ). The three business cycle phases might be interpreted as normal growth (S t = 1), mild recession (S t = 2), and severe recession (S t = 3). 
Multiple monthly indicators.
Chauvet (1998) and Kim and Nelson (1998) proposed incorporating business-cycle shifts directly into a model like that in Stock and Watson (1989) . The unobserved state of the business cycle is represented by a scalar c t that is subject to regime shifts,
where η t ∼ N (0, σ 2 η ) and α St = α 1 when the economy overall is in a recession (S t = 1) and α S t = α 2 in expansion, with transitions between S t = 1 and 2 again governed by a Markov chain.
Each of 4 indicators is presumed related to the business cycle according to
with the idiosyncratic factor v rt itself exhibiting AR(1) dynamics:
Variants of the same four indicators used by Stock and Watson-growth rates of industrial production, personal income, sales, and employment-can also be used here. Chauvet and Hamilton (2006) and Chauvet and Piger (2008) conducted simulated real-time exercises on these type of models suggesting that they could perform well in real time.
Since August 2006, Piger has been posting the probabilities calculated by this model almost every month on a publicly available web page.
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The actual real-time filter inferences for each month, P (S t = 1|y t , y t−1 , ..., y 1 ;θ t ) are plotted in the top panel of Figure 16 . This filter probability first moved above 50% in Piger's November 1, 2008 report which was based on data describing August. The probability moved to 99.2% when the September data became available but fell back to 16.1% with the next month's data which showed industrial production and real personal income less transfers to be growing again in October. Chauvet and Piger (2008) had recommended an inference rule of declaring a recession as soon as three consecutive values of P (S t−k = 1|y t , y t−1 , ..., y 1 ;θ t ) were all above 80%. This threshold was passed with the release of the October data, for although P (S t = 1|y t , y t−1 , ..., y 1 ;θ t ) was only 16.1% based on t = October 2008 data, Pr(S t−k = 1|y t , y t−1 , ..., y 1 ;θ t ) was above 80% for k = 1, 2, and 3 (see the bottom panel of Figure 16 ). Chauvet and Piger's (2008) announced rule would then date the start of the recession as the earliest k for which this probability was above 50%, which turned out to be This actual real-time experience confirms that there is useful additional information in the monthly indicators, though some caution is necessary before trying to use this framework as an actual real-time basis for recognizing business cycle turning points. Chauvet and Potter (2010) also emphasize the need to allow for instability over time of monthly indicator models.
Inference from panel data.
Hamilton and Owyang (2009) proposed a method for forming an inference based on data on employment growth for each of the separate 48 contiguous U.S. states. The assumption is that each state n might be in recession or not for any given quarter t (S nt = 1 or 2 for n = 1, ..., 48)
with the quarterly employment growth rate for state n and quarter t, y nt , governed by y nt |S nt ∼ N (µ S nt , σ 2 n ). Our hypothesis was that certain clusters of states might be in recession together and that the determination of which cluster is in recession at any given date was governed by a larger Markov chain. The smoothed probability of each cluster being in recession at any given date is reported in Figure 18 . Of particular interest is the blue line, which tracks the probability that we were at that date experiencing a national recession in which every state participated. These track closely the NBER dates, though assign a much longer duration to the recession of 2001 on the basis of its "jobless recovery."
What is perhaps remarkable is that the model concluded that, with virtual certainty, the U.S.
economy had entered a national recession as of 2007:Q2. I publicized this particular graph and its implication that we were well into another recession on Econbrowser on April 3, 2008. Although the inference proved to be prescient, it is again one I wouldn't trust out of sample. For one thing, the model attributed all the comovement between states to these recession clusters, an assumption that was necessary given our estimation algorithm but that is clearly implausible. If you really think you're getting 48 independent observations on something, it's correct that you could be virtually certain of your inference, but this is an artifact of assuming independence rather than a correct assessment of the uncertainty. The fact that employment growth behaved so differently for the 2001 recession as in previous recessions is another reason to be queasy about relying on such a model. It nevertheless again illustrates the potential gains from using multiple indicators, in this case employment data at the level of individual states.
Mixed-frequency inference.
Camacho and Perez-Quiros (2010) which point it fell to 6%. Based on these results, the approach appears extremely promising.
There is again of course the concern that with so many estimated parameters, the subsequent out-of-sample real-time performance may deteriorate.
Other approaches
I have focused in the last two sections exclusively on Markov-switching time series models, in part because this is the approach with the most clearly established out-of-sample real-time track record. But there are a number of promising ideas from alternative perspectives. Here I very briefly mention a few.
One can think of any probit prediction of NBER classifications, such as that by Wright discussed in Section 2, as being driven by an unobserved latent Gaussian variable z * t governed by
with NBER recession classifications S t characterized by
and therefore optimally forecast using the formula
Dueker (2005) proposed to think of z * t as part of a VAR 8 including also the observed variables y t and used Bayesian methods to infer parameters based on historical observations of y 1 , ..., y T and NBER classifications S 1 , ..., S T , which he called a qual-VAR specification. Given the model 8 That is, (9) is generalized to
parameters, one can then calculate an optimal forecast of future business cycle phases conditional on whatever is actually known as of some out-of-sample date τ: P (S τ +k = 1|y τ , y τ −1 , ..., y 1 , S τ −r , S τ −r−1 , ..., S 1 ;θ) for S τ −r the most recent NBER classification known with certainty as of date τ . Dueker (2008) (Hamilton, 2008b) . Berge and Jordà (2009) proposed using the receiver operating characteristic curve as a basis for systematically selecting such indicators y rt , and concluded that the national activity index developed by Stock and Watson (1999) and regularly updated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago is a particularly promising indicator. Harding and Pagan (2006) formalized the traditional Burns and Mitchell (1946) approach of identifying local peaks and troughs in a series and then looking for maximal correspondence between the inference from individual series to identify an aggregate recession. Chauvet and Piger (2008) found this approach performed reasonably well with simulated real-time data, though it appeared to be dominated by their 4-indicator Markov-switching specification.
Conclusion
This paper discussed approaches to recognizing business cycle turning points using a variety of data sets and specifications. There is a trade-off between parsimony and making full use of all available information. A very simple model based on GDP alone appears reasonably robust to data revisions and structural change and so far has a good real-time out-of-sample track record, but could clearly be improved upon. Averaging the inference from alternative specifications or using Bayesian approaches to constrain more richly parameterized specifications are worth exploring.
A particularly promising approach is to combine data of different frequencies. Table 1 Parameter estimates based on (1) characteristics of expansions and recessions as classified by NBER, and (2) values that maximize the observed sample log likelihood of postwar GDP growth rates over 1947:Q2 to 2004:Q2.
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